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Nov.-Dec., 1955

DICTA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By FREDERICK P. CRANSTON of the Denver Bar
GENERAL STATEMENT

The consistent pattern followed in this field applies well established rules to specific fact situations and emphasizes the importance of proper interpretation of constitutional and statutory
language. Having determined upon the proper interpretation, those
charged with administrative duties thereunder and those affected
thereby must not deviate therefrom with respect to the matters
giving rise to the remedy sought or resisted nor with respect to
the method of pursuit of or defense against such remedy.
The cases will be discussed with relationship to the principles
announced rather than in chronological order.
I.
An administrative agency must act within the scope of the
authority conferred by the power creating it. Two cases fall within
this rule.
In Union Pacific Railroad Company et al. v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission et al.,' the parties other than the Commission
operated all except five of the wells producing both oil and gas in
the Rangely Field. The legislature had invested the Commission
with authority to enforce a statute forbidding waste of oil or gas,
the production of gas in an excessive or unreasonable amount from
wells producing both oil and gas, and the production of oil or gas
in such quantities or in such manner as would unreasonably reduce
reservoir pressure or unreasonably diminish the quantity of oil or

gas that might ultimately be produced. The Commission was vested
with authority to make and enforce such rules and regulations as
might be reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of the
act. Pursuant thereto, it made a regulation requiring all gas not
needed for lease operations or used locally for domestic or municipal needs to be returned to the reservoir. Plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the enforcement of this regulation. The court held that
the authority delegated to the Commission to prevent the production of gas in an excessive or unreasonable amount or in such manner as would not unreasonably reduce reservoir pressure did not
embrace the authority to make a regulation requiring excess gas
to be returned to the reservoir. The court recognized the advantages which might accrue from such a regulation, but nevertheless
enjoining its enforcement applying the well-established principle
that "the Commission may act only within the authority delegated
by the legislature under standards clearly fixed by the law, leaving no discretion in the Commission to declare what the law is."
As a result of this decision, the 1956 legislature will probably
'284 P. 2d 242.
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be given the ,opportunity to grant or to refuse to grant to the Commission the power to make such a regulation.
Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. Racing Commission,2 was another
case where a commission was held to have exceeded the power
delegated to it by the legislature. The racing act provided that
this Commission should license, regulate and supervise races and
pari mutuel wagering at which animals participated, should visit
and inspect such places at least once a year, and should require
such places to be constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with the laws of the state and the regulations of the Commission. The act provided certain limitations relative to the issuance
of licenses, the number of certain types of meets to be held in
any one county each year, the duration thereof, the distance of competitive tracks from each other, and that no race meets should be
conducted on Sunday. The statute also enumerated the eligibility
requirements and factors which would make applicants ineligible.
None of the restrictions rendered the plaintiff nor the locality ineligible. The Commission denied the plaintiff's application for a
license on the ground that there were already three tracks, including one forty-five miles distant from the proposed site, and because
180 days of racing had been permitted on the Eastern Slope and
the Commission felt the grant of the license would not be in the
best interest of racing nor of the state. The Supreme Court held
that the license should have been issued; that the Commission assumed powers and exercised discretion beyond the limitations described in the act; that the statute did not vest in the Commission
the authority to declare public policy, public policy having been
established by the vote of the people implemented by an act of the
legislature. It was not for the Commission to say what may or may
not be the need of certain localities nor what is in the best interest
of racing. While recognizing the duty to give full respect to the
findings of the Commission, such respect is to be accorded only if
the discretion is exercised on matters which the administrative
agency could lawfully consider. The power, granted by the statute
to prepare and promulgate a complete set of rules and regulations
to govern the race meets in the state and to determine and announce the place, time and duration thereof, is not a sufficient grant
of discretion so as to permit a limitation of the number of licenses
for reasons other than those specified in the statute. This construction is fortified by the provision that the Commission is commanded
to renew an application if no violation has been committed by the
operator, indicating the legislative policy of withholding authority
from this Commission in contrast to the broad authority granted
to the licensing authorities by the liquor code and the boxing and
wrestling act in each of which discretion was given to the respective adminstrative agency to limit the number of licenses. The
fact that the legislature could easily have given such power in the
2

277 P. 2d 226.
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manner followed by previous legislatures indicates that the legislature did not intend to give this Commission such broad powers.
The Commission's statement that the refusal was in the best interest of racing violates elementary principles of constitutional
law to the effect that the propriety, necessity and expedience of
legislation is for legislative determination only. The court was
unwilling to ascertain public policy from any source other than the
constitution and statutes. The Commission by its denial of a
license attempted to exercise a power which it did not possess.
Justice Alter concurred in the result. Justice Moore in behalf of himself, Chief Justice Stone and Justice Clark dissented
on the ground that racing is not inherently lawful but on the
contrary had been historically and inherently a gambling enterprise legalized only by virtues of the statute. The regulation of
this activity involve public morals and general welfare and thus
warranted an exercise of police power in the public interest. No applicant has an inherent right to engage in the business of racing and
wagering thereon. A license so to do is a privilege to be granted
or withheld in. the Commission's discretion. The statute granted
authority to license, determine the kind, time and place of racing
meets and consider the location of tracks; the statute limited the
power only in certain specific instances. The intent was to tell the
Commission when it cannot license, thus granting discretion in t~le
field outside the prohibited area. The Commission did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, and its ruling should not be
set aside in situations where reasonable minds might reach opposite conclusions. The court should not substitute its own judgment
for that of the administrative body.
II.
Although the action taken by an administrative agency is within
the scope of the power conferred, nevertheless in exercising discretion in carrying out its functions, it must adhere to the standards
prescribed by the authority creating it.
In Civil Service Commission v. Frazzini,3 the plaintiff asserted that the method employed by the Civil Service Commission
in conducting an examination for assistant fire chief and deputy
fire chief was improper, and, therefore, the appointment of the
successful applicant was improper. Under the procedure followed,
the oral examination was given a weight of 60, and merit and
seniority were each given a weight of 20. On the oral test and
individual interview test, there were eight factors considered upon
which each examiner gave each applicant a rating from A to E,
inclusive. The Denver charter required a competitive examination.
The court held with plaintiff in his contention that this method
precluded a competitive examination because it made objective
grading impossible and, accordingly, the grades given were depen' 287 P. 2d 433.
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dent entirely upon the impression made upon the individual interviewer rather than upon fixed standards which could accurately
and objectively determine the result. "By the very nature of a
subjective examination of this character, the likelihood of abuse,
favoritism and human error are inherent, and greatest care and
caution should be exercised by the Commission to avoid the possibility of these results . . . If personality factors are embraced
within the examination, the announcement should specifically so
state." In brief, the examination did not produce an objective
test; it was therefore not competitive. The Commission thereby
disregarded the standard prescribed. The court further held that
under the facts of this case, there was no estoppel because the candidate certified by the Commission will be returned to his former
position and, therefore, sustained no damage by reason of the
irregularities.
III.
If the administrative agency succeeds in avoiding the above pitfalls, has jurisdiction,regularly pursues its authority and does not
abuse its discretion, the courts will not review the merits of its
determination.
In Glenn v. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners.4 the
court comments that "the record in this case discloses a conglomerate mixture of procedural monstrosities." To avoid embarrassment, the court exonerated plaintiff's present counsel because such
counsel occupied "third place on the list of attorneys who have
represented him during the course of this litigation." The court
recognized the difficulties under which counsel operated and offered some slight encouragement by stating that they might have
done better had they represented the plaintiff throughout the proceedings.
The plaintiff who had been licensed to practice medicine was
charged with having uttered false narcotic prescriptions, being himself addicted to narcotic drugs for which he wrote prescriptions
for himself and others, all of which action allegedly constituted
grossly unprofessional and immoral conduct. The claim was that
the Commission in revoking his license to practice after a hearing
had made its determination upon insufficient evidence and as
a result of passion and prejudice.
In sustaining the Commission, the court stated that it had
many times announced that it was restricted on a review to a consideration of "wh-ether the Board had jurisdiction; abused its discretion; or regularly pursued its authority." It considered the
facts only to the extent of determining whether the Board wrongfully exercised its authority without proper or judicious discretion,
4 284

P. 2d 230.
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and having determined that it did not so act, held that the merits
of the case were not involved.
With respect to the charge of passion and prejudice, the court
stated:
The record clearly shows that said Board treated
plaintiff with every courtesy and give him every opportunity and any other finding would have been but a whitewash and the exercise of an unjustified leniency to the
detriment of the public welfare.
IV.
The sovereign and the citizen must properly pursue the remedy in
the manner and form prescribed by the authority creating the
remedy. The case of the aggrieved citizen will be first considered.
In Heron v. City and County of Denver,5 the court held that,
if an administrative agency makes a mistake, the way to correct
it is to exhaust the administrative remedy before commencing a
civil action. The Denver building code provided that only a licensed
architect may submit plans and specifications for public or semipublic buildings. The plaintiff being an engineer but not a Colorado
architect submitted plans and specifications, but a building permit
was denied. The building code provided that a person thus aggrieved should seek relief within a specified time from the Board
of Appeals created by the code. The plaintiff by-passed this procedure by the island-hopping tactics of commencing an action
in the District Court, defending his position by the contention that
the issuance of the building permit was a ministerial act and not
one which required the intermediate step of applying to the Board
of Appeals. The court, however, remained unconvinced, stating:
Unless the administrative remedies are exhausted,
it never can be known what correction would ensue if the
authority is given full opportunity to pass upon the matter. Our court has adhered rather strictly to the requirement of the exhaustion of administrative remedies before
the court will take jurisdiction.
The above rule is applicable where an arm of the state considers that the sovereign has been aggrieved.
In People ex rel Kimball, Director of Game and Fish Department v. Crystal River Corporation,6 it appeared that a bear had
caused the death of forty-four sheep. The owner of the sheep,
pursuant to the statute which gave him a right of action against
the sovereign, made claim, pursuant to which arbitrators were appointed as the statute directed. The Game and Fish Department
submitted evidence and named one of the arbitrators. The award
5 283 P. 2d 647.
a 280 P. 2d 429.
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was made and certified in favor of the claimant but was attacked
by the Commission. The court held that the sovereign having consented to this method of determining the liability is bound by the
action of the proper administrative agency; and the arbitrators
having jurisdiction, a writ of certiorari would not issue as a matter
of right, but only on good cause shown which would justify an
inference of fraud or abuse of discretion on the part of the arbitrators. Neither the individual nor the agency of the state may
participate in the selection of the arbitrators, attend the hearings,
submit evidence and, in the event of an adverse finding, seek a
review merely because the award is unfavorable.
V.
A statute of limitation does not bar a proceeding to recover from
the estate of a decedent funds of the sovereign paid by an administrative agency to the decedent which the decedent was not entitled to receive.
In State of Colorado v. Estate of Griffith,7 the decedent had
been an old age pension recipient. After her death, it appeared
that the extent of her property holdings rendered her ineligible
to have received any pension. Within the six months, Jefferson
County Welfare Department filed a claim to recover a portion of
the amount paid; after the six months it amended its claim to
recover the entire amount paid. The state filed its claim for the
same entire amount as a matter of security against the contingency
that the Welfare Department's claim might be disallowed. The
court held that time does not run against the sovereign. This principle can more forcibly be applied in the case of fraud than in other
cases. The claim of Jefferson County Department of Public Welfare as an arm of the state should have been allowed.
VI.
The recent inaugurationof a strict construction of tax exemptions
will be adhered to.
In Grace Calvary Church v. City and County of Denver,8 the
church had purchased land at a tax sale for the purpose of erecting
a building, but it was denied a building permit because it was on
the route of the proposed Valley Highway. The action was to recover taxes previously paid on the ground that the property was
exempt.
The statute exempts from taxation "lots with the buildings
thereon, if said buildings are used exclusively for religious worship." In former decisions, the court had held that where it was
contemplated that structures were to be used and steps were to be
taken to indicate such intention, the exemption would apply. In
one such decision, an excavation had been dug and a foundation
1275 P. 2d 945.
9 274 P. 2d 983.

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1955

commenced, and in another case an existing building had been
demolished with the intention of erecting a new building in its
place. However, this liberality had been discarded by the court
in the case of City and County of Denver v. George Washington
Lodge Association," wherein Justice Stone stated:
It is not surprising in view of the former decisions
of this court that the trial court so held (in favor of the
exemption.) However, a departure is not less a departure
because it is made step by step, and it appears high time
for this court to determine not merely how far we have
departed from the last departure, but whether we have
departed from requirements of the statute itself.
In the case before the court, the application for a building
permit followed by its denial was not even the vestige of a structure, and in the absence of the structure, the requirement of the
statute was not met, and the exemption necessarily failed.
CONCLUSION
The above decisions indicate that administrative agencies and
persons dealing with them or affected by their actions can anticipate strict construction with respect particularly to the limitations
of authority, the abuse of discretion, exhausting the administrative
remedy, the finality of determinations by such agencies acting
properly within their authority, and a strict construction likewise
of any privilege of exemption or statutory limitation which would
impair the public revenue. The broad inference is that powers
conferred and privileges granted must be clearly contained in
legislative language and that failure to observe procedural requirements invites disaster.
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Notes From The Secretary

The final report of the Economic Survey and Minimum Fees
Committee of The Colorado Bar Association is now being readied
for publication. At the present time our thought is that it will be
a part of the Annual Report, which will be mailed to the members
in late January or early February. The report is very extensive
and includes summaries and tables on both the Economic Survey
Questionnaires and the Minimum Fee Questionnaires. We are sure
that all of you will look forward to this report with great interest.
The Grievance Committee of The Denver Bar Association has
had numerous complaints filed with it during the past few months.
Most of these complaints referred to the method of charging fees
1121

Colo. 470, 217 P. 2d 617.

